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Abstract 
The paper develops a multilevel approach to the design and analysis of systems with 
“action-oriented perception”, situating various robot and animal “designs” in an evolution- 
ary perspective. We present a set of biological design principles within a broader 
perspective that shows their relevance for robot design. We introduce schemas to provide a 
coarse-grain analysis of “cooperative computation” in the brains of animals and the 
“brains” of robots, starting with an analysis of approach, avoidance, detour behavior, and 
path planning in frogs. An explicit account of neural mechanism of avoidance behavior in 
the frog illustrates how schemas may be implemented in neural networks. The focus of the 
rest of the article is on the relation of instinctive to reflective behavior. We generalize an 
analysis of the interaction of perceptual schemas in the VISIONS system for computer 
vision to a view of the interaction of perceptual and motor schemas in distributed planning 
which, we argue, has great promise for integrating mechanisms for action and perception in 
both animal and robot. We conclude with general observations on the lessons on relating 
structure and function which can be carried from biology to technology. 
1. An evolutionary background 
Agents do not have an unlimited repertoire of behavior. An animal evolves 
within a certain ecological niche, and even that “general-purpose” animal, the 
human, builds on its evolutionary heritage to acquire specialized skills that fit the 
person for a relatively limited set of roles in society. Similarly, when we write a 
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computer program or build a robot, we design it to carry out a certain repertoire 
of tasks. The animal or the robot comes with specialized receptors which allow it 
to sense only a subset of the energies available in the environment, and has 
specialized effecters. including those which can mediate active sensing. (For a 
formal characterization of evolutionary specialization based on environmental 
constraints see Horswill [20].) 
We will focus upon a particular animal, the frog (and its close cousin, the toad) 
to construct a biological “robot” which will allow us to see more carefully the way 
in which a specific biological system has evolved-but our task will be to 
understand the integrated style of action and perception that such evolution 
yields, rather than to chart the evolutionary process itself. We start with an 
analysis of aspects of the basic survival behaviors of feeding and fleeing- 
approach and avoidance-and then model the control structures of the animal 
either as a network of interacting automata-like systems, which we call schemas 
(or in some cases, schema instances) [4], or as neural networks which implement 
the functionality of these schemas. 
The work in the next three sections is part of a general research program called 
Rana computatrix (the frog that computes), an evolving testbed for multilevel 
modeling (in terms of both schemas and neural networks) of the mechanisms of 
visuomotor coordination [2]. Frog and toad are sufficiently similar that our 
generic model applies to both of them. Thus, except when referring to specific 
experiments carried out with one or the other animal, we will use the term “frog” 
throughout when the generic frog/toad is meant. While the core constraint of the 
Rana computatrix study is to understand the biological data, the work is at the 
same time designed to yield case studies which can point us to a more general 
understanding of principles of action-oriented perception of the animal/robot 
acting in the world. 
2. Schemas for approach and avoidance 
To simplify rather drastically, we may say that the frog’s ability to find food and 
escape enemies can be reduced to the ability to tell small moving objects from 
large ones. A frog surrounded by dead flies will starve to death, but the frog will 
snap with equal “enthusiasm” at a moving fly or a pencil tip wiggled in a fly-like 
way. On the other hand, a larger moving object can trigger an escape reaction. 
Thus, at a very simple level, we might imagine that the brain of the toad has two 
basic pattern-recognition routines (what we shall call perceptual schemas), one for 
recognizing small moving objects (food-like stimuli) and one for recognizing large 
moving objects (enemy-like stimuli). We could then come up with the very simple 
model shown in Fig. l(a) in which we have the signals from the eye routed to 
these two perceptual schemas. If the small-moving-object schema is activated, it 
will in turn trigger the motor schema (our term for an automaton or control 
system for controlling action) to get the animal to approach what is apparently its 
prey; while if the perceptual schema for large moving objects is activated, it will 
M.A. Arbib, J.-S. Liaw I Artificial Intelligence 72 (1995) 53-79 55 
small moving 
objects 
perceptual 
schemas 
large moving 
objects 
snap 
motor 
schemas 
avoid 
1 1 
(4 ( 
nwmwewt cdmhJlRvr 
all moving 
objects 
perceptual 
schemas 
large moving 
objects 
snap 
I 
tW ( 
motor 
schemas 
avoid 
1 
nw Iwlkwt C~irVlAvS 
Fig. 1. (a) The “naive” schema program for the toad’s snapping and avoidance behavior. (b) The 
schema program revised in light of data on the effect of lesioning the pretectum. 
trigger the motor schema for avoidance, causing the animal to escape an apparent 
enemy. 
Before going further, we may note that the system in Fig. l(a) involves four 
simple automata, and Lyons and Arbib [34] have modeled schema instances as 
port automata in applying them to perceptual robotics. However, rather than 
simply process input symbols to yield output symbols, the individual automata 
have activation levels which measure some degree of confidence, and it is the 
more active of the two perceptual schemas that will trigger the appropriate motor 
schema to yield the appropriate response. We may say that the perceptual 
schemas compete to control the behaviour of the animal. This is a very simple 
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example of the type of mechanisms of competition and cooperation that can be 
exhibited by a network of schemas. In particular, multiple motor schemas may be 
coactivated to control subtle behaviors [ 111. 
Notice the important point that perceptual schemas do not serve simply as 
YES-NO recognizers, equipped with a confidence level, but rather serve to 
provide a parametric description which can be used in tuning motor behavior 
appropriately. When it recognizes prey, the animal does not respond with a 
launch in a standard or random direction, but rather it snaps at the position in 
3-D space where the prey is located. Similarly, as we shall see in more detail in 
Section 4. when the animal sees a predator-like stimulus, it must find an escape 
direction that will have a good likelihood of taking it out of the path of the 
predator. 
We now consider how such a model can become a biological model as distinct 
from a purely functional model. Our assertion will be that a schema-based model 
(we turn to neural network models in a later section) becomes a biological model 
when explicit hypotheses are offered as to how the constituent schemas are played 
over particular regions of the brain. For the examples to be offered in this paper, 
some simple anatomy will suffice: The right eye of the frog projects to the left half 
of the brain, with the most important visual midbrain target being the tectum. The 
projection from the retina to the layered structure of the tectum preserves the 
neighborhood relationships of the retina (and thus the visual field), and is called a 
retinotopic map. We will also study the pretectum (so called because it is in front 
of the tectum). Returning to the schemas of Fig. l(a), we may note (without 
giving the details) that experimentalists had reason to suggest that the small- 
moving-object schema was in the tectum. while the large-moving-object schema 
was in the pretectum. Such hypotheses about neural localization may be tested by 
lesion experiments. The model of Fig. l(a) predicts that animals with a pretectal 
lesion would continue to approach small moving objects just as the normal animal 
would, but would not respond at all to large moving objects. 
However, the model is false! Peter Ewert studied toads (see [15] for a review) 
in which the pretectum had been lesioned. He found that not only did the toads 
respond to small moving objects with approach behavior, but they also responded 
to large moving objects with approach behavior! This observation leads to the 
new schema-level model shown in Fig. l(b). The new data tell us that in the 
absence of the pretectum, the animal must be able to respond to all moving 
objects with approach. Thus, we replace the left-hand perceptual schema for 
small moving objects by a perceptual schema for all moving objects. On the other 
hand, in the normal animal, we have that recognition of large moving objects 
triggers avoidance and so we leave the right-hand column the way it was. 
However, although we have now explained the response of the lesioned animal to 
all moving objects, and the response of the normal animal to large moving 
objects, it remains to tune the model so that the normal animal will respond to 
small moving objects with approach but not avoidance. This we can achieve by 
having an inhibitory pathway running from the perceptual schema for large 
moving objects (in the pretectum) to the approach schema-or, equivalently, to 
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the schema for all moving objects. With this model we can now explain our small 
database on the behavior of both normal animals and those with a lesion of the 
pretectum. We have thus established that hypotheses about neural localization of 
subschemas may be tested by lesion experiments. As we shall see below, we may 
then proceed further to model a brain region to see if its neural circuitry will 
indeed implement the posited schemas. The important point is that biological 
models can be expressed at the level of a network of interacting “automata”, and 
that these can really be biological models that can be tested at the level of such a 
coarse-grained network, whether or not data or hypotheses are available about 
the fine-grain implementation of those automata in neural networks. 
With this background, we are well on our way to understanding our first 
principle: 
Principle 1 (Cooperative computation of schemas). The functions of perceptual- 
motor behavior and intelligent action of animals and robots situated in the world 
can be expressed as a network of interacting schemas/schema instances. The 
method of interaction of schemas/schema instances is “cooperative computation” 
(Competition/Cooperation) so that “computations” which are often seen as the 
province of traditional symbol-based processing are carried out by distributed 
“neuron-like” methods which do not involve explicit symbolic control. This not 
only serves as a basis for coordinated motor actions, but for reactive planning, 
and intelligent behavior, including the use of language. 
In biology, we must discover how the schemas are distributed across bio- 
logically distinct brain regions. In robotics, the schema analysis and the allocation 
of processors may occur in tandem as part of an explicit design process (see 
Section 8). 
3. Detours and path planning 
In the present section, we show how a study of frog behavior led to a model of 
path planning that was then applied to the design of the control of mobile robots, 
and which anticipated an important area of robot control. The motivation for this 
work is provided by Ingle’s study [22] of a frog observing a worm through a 
semi-transparent grating or barrier. Instead of launching directly at its prey as 
would occur if no barrier is present, the frog reacts appropriately, detouring 
around the barrier to get its prey. We note here how this behavior leads us to 
extend the schema picture of Fig. l(b). Now, the perceptual schema for 
recognizing prey must be augmented by the perceptual schema for recognizing a 
barrier, and there can no longer be a simple direct path from prey recognition to 
the triggering of approach behavior. Rather, there must be some way for this path 
to be modulated by the recognition of the barrier to yield an indirect detour, 
rather than the direct response. 
In the particular situation under consideration here, the animal must not only 
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recognize prey and barrier, but must locate them in space. If it can recognize that 
the prey is in front of the barrier or at most a tongue’s length behind, then the 
animal will indeed snap directly. But if the prey is further behind the barrier, then 
the animal must use its recognition of where the prey is and where the barrier is 
to come up with a path which will carry it around the barrier towards the prey. 
Arbib and House [6] offered a model of this in which perceptual schemas for 
prey and barrier can drive motor schemas which compete and cooperate to yield 
the overall behavior (Fig. 2). We postulate that the ground plane in front of the 
animal is represented in the brain, with the worm being represented as a global 
attractor: each point in the “arena” has a vector pointing towards the worm, with 
the vectors decreasing in length with distance from the prey, but not vanishing 
(Fig. 2(a)). On the other hand, each fence post is represented as a local repellor, 
such that animal will be repelled either to left or right if it comes close to the 
fence post, but will not be affected if it is further away (Fig. 2(B)). When we 
combine the action of the individual fence posts, we get a strong vector field to 
the left of the post and a strong vector field to the right. If we combine all this 
activity we get the field shown in Fig. 2(c) which can be integrated to yield 
trajectories which either pass to the left or to the right of the fence and then 
continue en route to the prey. 
It is not our claim here that that he brainstem of the frog implements the 
above potential field algorithm in its neural circuitry. Rather, the crucial point is 
that we have an evolutionary account of how such a system might arise (Fig. 3): 
The elements of the prey-recognition system-perceptual schema, motor schema, 
and motor pattern generator (MPG)-co-evolve so that activity in the prey- 
schema can represent a goal in such a way that the approach-schema provides the 
right control signals for the MPG to determine a path to the prey; while the 
detour system evolves (or co-evolves) by combining a perceptual schema for 
stationary objects with a motor schema that modulates the effect that the 
approach-schema has on the motor pattern generator. 
In building upon this approach, Arkin [7] developed a hybrid architecture for 
the control of a mobile robot. The robot was equipped with a map of its “world” 
and, given a knowledge of its current position and of where it was to go, it could 
plan a path.’ What Arkin did was to translate such a path into a vector field which 
consists of vectors pointing along the path plus “diagonal” vectors in the 
neighborhood of the path pointing the robot back onto the central path in a 
direction tending towards that of the path. He then added to the system a “frog 
brain” to navigate around obstacles-not actually grafting a biological brain onto 
the control computer of the robot, but augmenting the AI planner with a 
’ In fact, this planner was more “symbolic” than “neural”. The study of animals rests on the 
expectation that all schemas will be implemented in neural networks, or will be expressed in the 
functional interactions of the neural networks and the biomechanical systems they control-i.e., they 
will represent the function of a dynamic system not all of which need be neural. However, in an 
artificial system, different implementations may be optimal for different schema% and for many tasks 
symbolic processing will marry well with available VLSI technology. 
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Fig. 2. The potential fields depicted here represent an exploratory attempt at defining a set of 
primitive fields which will interact in interpreting a complex scene. Each field provides, for each 
position in the ground plane, a vector showing the direction and “strength” of a movement he animal 
might make were it situated at that position. (a) A single prey object sets up a radially symmetric 
attractant field whose strength decays gradually with distance from the prey. (b) A single barrier 
object sets up a repellant field whose effect is more localized to its point of origin than is that of the 
prey field. The barrier field is not radially symmetric but has a lateral component hat is stronger but 
decays more rapidly with distance than does its opposing component. (c) The effect of the interaction 
of the fields from several barrier objects arranged to form a fence is to provide a strong lateral thrust 
at the fence ends. The lateral components produced by the interior posts is effectively cancelled by 
neighboring posts. The net field produced by the interaction of all of the elements of the configuration 
can then be thought of as tracing out a set of paths, most of which are diverted around the fence ends. 
(Arbib and House [6]). 
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Fig. 3. The evolutionary refinement of adding detour behaviour to prey-approach by modulating the 
basic system for approaching prey. 
potential field system similar to that in the Arbib-House study of the toad. When 
an obstacle was detected along the path, it set up a local repulsive field. The 
robot’s path was then determined by the local field established by the path vectors 
and the obstacles. In general, the robot would follow the path, detouring to one 
side on detecting an obstacle. After being displaced toward the side and leaving 
the field of the obstacle, it would move back towards the center of the path and 
then continue following the path specified by the AI planner. Such a method has 
now been discussed many times as the “potential field” method for path planning 
in robotics (see, e.g., [25,26]). See [38] f or an alternative approach to path 
planning. 
To close this section, we emphasize not so much the particular implementation 
of the schemas, but rather the evolving subtlety of the schema interactions. We 
start with two basic systems (Fig. l(a)) for response to small and large moving 
objects, respectively, and then find that if we are to match the biological strategy 
we must come to the more subtle interactions shown in Fig. l(b), in which 
recognition of small moving objects is not in fact localized in any one region, but 
is rather a system property involving the modulation of the tectum by the 
pretectum. We then extend the complexity of the environment to which the 
animal responds-it no longer contains a single prey or a single predator to which 
the animal may respond with the most basic forms of the “survival behaviors” of 
feeding or fleeing, but now contains the more subtle structure of obstacles which 
can block the animal’s path and around which the animal must now be equipped 
to detour. In evolutionary terms, this corresponds to expansion of the ecological 
niche in which the animal is well suited to survive-just as Arkin’s basic design for 
a mobile robot was extended from path-following in an uncluttered environment 
to work in a world which contains obstacles. We now have a sense of the new 
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perceptual schemas that must be added (for barrier detection) as well as the type 
of modulation that must be involved. This leads us to our next principle: 
Principle 2 (Evolution and modulation). New schemas often arise as 
“modulators” of existing schemas, rather than as new systems with independent 
functional roles. 
Further examples of Principle 2 may be seen in the lesion-based analysis of 
schemas for approach and avoidance behavior [ll]. Here it simply suffices to note 
that this strategy for the analysis for biological systems may be traced back to the 
work of Braitenberg [8] and Walter [47], and has a number of points in common 
with the approach to the design of robot controllers offered by Brooks [9]. 
4. Neural mechanism of avoidance behavior 
We now complete our introduction to biological analysis of “robots” by briefly 
outlining a specific example of how the schemas which serve animal behavior can 
be traced down to the neural networks that implement them.* Fig. 4 shows a 
number of escape behaviors exhibited by the frog. In Figs. 4(a)-(c) [22], we see 
the direction of approach of a large moving object, and we see bars radiating from 
the head of the frog providing a histogram of the relative frequency with which 
the animal chooses a particular escape direction over a number of trials. The 
escape direction may be briefly characterized as a compromise between the 
forward direction of the animal and the direction immediately away from the 
looming stimulus. Barriers can modify avoidance behavior, just as they modify 
approach behavior. If we use the data from Fig. 4(b) to determine the preferred 
direction of the animal for a looming stimulus coming directly from the left of the 
frog and interpose a barrier to block that preferred direction, then, as we see in 
Fig. 4(d), the behavior of the animal changes and it no longer tends to jump in 
the previously preferred direction, but just to the left or just to the right of the 
barrier. In the rest of the section, we will not return to the study of barriers, but 
will instead look in more detail at how the looming stimulus is recognized, and 
how this recognition is transformed into action. 
Before doing so, we look at more recent experimental data [23] which show 
that the behavior is actually more subtle (Fig. 4(e)). In Fig. 4(a)-(c), we saw that 
if a stimulus is looming directly at the frog, its escape direction will be a 
compromise between the direction away from the stimulus and the forward 
direction of the frog. However, Fig. 4(e) shows that if, instead of moving directly 
towards the animal, the stimulus is on a trajectory which will carry it in front of 
‘Among the many biologically based neural network models have been developed as part of Rana 
computatrir are models of retina (Teeters and Arbib [44]), tectal-pretectal interactions in prey 
recognition (Cervantes-Ptrez, Lara and Arbib [lo]), and the role of anterior thalamus and medial 
pallium in habituation (Wang and Arbib [48]), as well as the model presented here. 
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Fig. 4. The escape direction. When a looming stimulus is on a collision course with a frog, the escape 
direction of the frog is a compromise between the forward direction and that away from the looming 
object (a)-(c). However, if a barrier is interposed in the preferred direction, the animal will tend to 
jump to either side (d). If the stimulus is not on a colliding trajectory, the frog will jump in such a 
direction as to “cut back” behind the looming object (e). ((a)-(d) are adapted from Ingle [22] and (e) 
from Ingle and von Hoff [23]). 
the animal, the frog will not respond based solely on the position of the looming 
stimulus, for in this case the animal would follow one of the trajectories shown in 
Fig. 4(a) which would carry it on a collision path with the predator, thus making it 
highly likely to be captured. Instead, the animal exhibits the highly adaptive 
“cutback” behavior shown in Fig. 4(e) which carries it on a path that is well away 
from that being pursued by the looming object. Here again we note an 
evolutionary refinement going from simple recognition of a predator to recogni- 
tion of the trajectory that the predator is following to find an escape direction 
based on this extra information. Clearly, it is an interesting question to under- 
stand how evolutionary pressure could yield an animal able to exhibit this more 
subtle repertoire. However, in this section our concern is with the neural 
mechanisms which provide the frog with this functional repertoire. Unlike the 
previous sections in which we have simply sought a specification of schemas 
(whether or not analyzed in terms of specific brain regions) to provide a functional 
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analysis of the behavior, we now look at the availability of neurophysiological 
data. 
To start the discussion going, we recall why the frog was initially seen as an 
interesting candidate for a “biological robot”. In one of the classic papers on 
neural networks, Pitts and McCulloch [40] offered a hypothetical network for the 
recognition of “universals’‘-in other words, for recognizing an object despite 
great variations in the size, position or orientation with which it was projected on 
the retina. They postulated ways in which arrays of feature detectors could be 
gathered together in such a way that invariants with respect to a variety of group 
operations could be found which would then yield a pattern of neural activity 
which corresponded to the “universals” of a pattern, rather than its particular 
presentation. On this basis, some ten years later Oliver Selfridge (well known for 
his 1959 paper on Pandemonium [43]) persuaded Lettvin to look for such a 
structure in the frog’s brain. The calculation of group invariants was not found to 
be exemplified, but arrays of feature detectors were indeed found. The ganglion 
cells of the retina, those which send their axons back to the brain, were classified 
in four different classes, and these four classes of cells were found to project to 
different depths in the tectum, forming four specific retinotopic maps. Even more 
excitingly, these maps appeared to be tied to the behavioral repertoire of the 
animal. If we call the four classes Rl, R2, R3 and R4 (remember each one is a 
spatially arrayed population of cells in the “output layer” of the retina) we find 
that the R3 cells seem to respond best to small moving objects-as if they were 
bug detectors-whereas the R4 cells seemed to respond best to the large moving 
objects-as if they were enemy detectors [29]. The slightly later work of Hubel 
and Wiesel (e.g., [21]) on cat and then monkey found cells in visual cortex which 
reported on the orientation of edges, and thus provided very low-level features 
for shape description. By contrast, it appeared that Lettvin et al. had hit the 
jackpot in linking vision to action by showing that the frog retina computed 
features specifically linked to the behavioral repertoire of approach and avoi- 
dance, feeding and fleeing. For this reason, as well as the linkage to the 
pioneering modeling of Pitts and McCulloch, the frog was seen in the 1960s to be 
an excellent candidate for a neural network analysis of a visual system which was 
not simply engaged in some sort of abstract pattern processing but was directly 
geared to the determination of appropriate actions. 
Fortunately or unfortunately, research over the subsequent years-both by 
neurophysiologists and by modelers-has shown that the story is not so simple, 
and that the frog really does need a brain (!) and not just a retina to determine 
whether to feed or flee. For example, it has been shown that the activity of the R3 
cells is quite complicated. To a first approximation it can be viewed as response to 
the leading edge of a moving object entering its receptive field (the region of the 
visual field in which patterns of illumination can affect the activity of the cell), 
rather than the presence of a prey-like object within the receptive field. Again 
(and this was already recognized by Lettvin et al.) the activity of the R4 cell can 
be better interpreted as just a measure of dimming-but clearly a predator by 
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casting a larger shadow will dim the receptive field more than prey, and thus 
excite the R4 cell more strongly. 
Many studies of visual processing or visually guided behavior ignore the 
particular transformations conducted by the retina, or simply reduce them to a 
contrast enhancement difference-of-Gaussians lateral inhibition mask. However, 
we [31] have taken as our starting point the properties of the R3 and R4 neurons. 
Recall that the R3 and R4 neurons (which have been modeled by Teeters and 
Arbib (441) form an array which stretches across the output layer of the retina. If 
we consider the effect of a dark looming stimulus, we will then see greatest 
activity amongst those R3 cells whose receptive fields include the leading edge or 
expanding boundary of that looming stimulus, whereas the R4 cells which will 
respond most strongly are those contained within the interior of that expanding 
pattern. We can then combine these cells to provide a model of the T3 cells (so 
called because they are type 3 among cells of the Tectum as characterized by their 
physiological response). The T3 cell will respond more and more strongly as a 
stimulus looms to a position at the center of its receptor field if the connections 
from R3 cells to the T3 cell are radially symmetric but with a sort of inverted 
Gaussian form in which activity towards the periphery is more effective than 
activity at the center. The larger the looming stimulus, the further out the pattern 
of R3 activity and thus the stronger the input to the T3 cell. Since the T3 cells also 
form a retinotopic array, many cells will be activated by this looming stimulus but 
the T3 whose receptive field is centered on the center of the looming stimulus will 
have the strongest response. To complete the design of the T3 cell, and to make it 
responsive to a large looming stimulus, but not to several small objects flying 
apart from each other or to an expanding ring, we give the R4 cells a standard 
Gaussian projection to the T3 cells so that darkness at the center of the receptive 
field of the T3 cell will increase its response. 
With this we have given analysis that does not simply explain how the presence 
of a looming stimulus can be represented by a peak of activity in an array of 
neurons, but also uses circuitry with cells whose firing rates provide a good model 
of firing rates actually observed neurophysiologically (see [31] for the details and 
simulations). We now have the neural network implementation of the perceptual 
schema required to explain the behavior shown in Figs. 4(a)-(c), where the 
current position of the looming stimulus on the retina implies the preferred 
direction of escape. However, to provide the necessary perceptual schema for the 
situation shown in Fig. 4(e), we must come up with cells that recognize the 
temporal to nasal motion across the retina. It turns out that the T2 neurons, also 
in tectum, do have this sensitivity. However, we have no neurophysiological data 
as to how these cells are actually wired up and so we use a standard model of 
directional selectivity to link an array of T3 neurons whose activity signals the 
current center of the looming stimulus feed to an array of T2 neurons in such a 
way that the passage of the stimulus from left to right will increase the likelihood 
of a T2 neuron firing. By contrast, if the pattern is moving in the opposite 
direction, then the direct activation of a T2 neuron by the corresponding T3 
neuron will be diminished by the inhibition received via delay neurons to the 
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right. The resultant neural network will respond more vigorously to a pattern 
moving from left to right than to a pattern moving from right to left, within a 
given velocity rangeP 
With this we have all the perceptual information we need to complete our 
model. In Fig. 5(a) we see the retinotopic map of T3 neurons (simplified from a 
two-dimensional to a one-dimensional retina for ease of comprehension here) 
with an appropriate projection pathway from neurons in the T3 array to neurons 
in what we call the motor heading map which will cause the animal to turn 
towards the retinotopically corresponding location. Unlike the projection from 
prey-recognition neurons to the motor heading map, in which retinotopically 
corresponding points are linked by the projection, we now set up the connections 
to replicate the data of Figs. 4(a)-4( ) c so that each peak of activity on the T3 
layer will yield a peak of activity in the motor heading map centered at the point 
T3 Neuron 
left right 
11111rl 
(4 
left right 
Motor Heading Map 
T2 Neuron T3 Neuron 
right 
II11111 
@I 
left right 
Motor Heading Map 
Fig. 5. Gating of the tectal projection onto motor heading map. Only half of the projections are 
shown here for simplicity. The T3 neurons project to the heading map to indicate the escape trajectory 
for looming object on a colliding trajectory. When the stimulus is crossing the visual field, the T2 
signal blocks the T3 signals while exciting the contralateral heading map, thus resulting in a “cutback” 
jump. 
3 Direction-selective neurons in mammalian visual systems each have a preferred (small) range of 
velocity so that together they provide a sort of population coding of stimulus velocity. Motion-related 
neurons in the anuran (R2, R3, T2, T3, etc.), on the other hand, respond to the entire range of 
velocity. The stimulus velocity is coded in their firing rate-the greater the speed, the higher the firing 
rate. In terms of stimulus direction, most ‘I?! cells prefer movement in the behaviorally significant 
temporal to nasal direction. 
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which is a compromise between the forward direction and the direction away from 
the looming stimulus. This will control the motor pattern generators to yield the 
Figs. 4(a)-(c) responses. 
The situation must now be made more subtle to address the data of Fig. 4(e), 
and we show how this is done in Fig. 5(b). First, we add the T2 array which again 
is retinotopic but is now signaling not simply that there is a looming stimulus at 
that point of the retina but that this stimulus i  moving from left to right. (We will 
not look at the corresponding connections for a stimulus on the right half of the 
visual field moving to the left-this will simply be the mirror image). This activity 
must block the normal escape response and so we see a projection from cells of 
the T2 array to the motor heading map which is a replica of the projection from 
the T3 array to the motor heading map-but this new projection is inhibitory. 
Thus, if there is no T2 activity the system will respond as in Fig. 5(a). To 
complete this extended model, we must now add a new excitatory pathway from 
the T2 neurons which project to the cutback direction, and thus can trigger the 
appropriate motor behavior in this case, while avoiding the normal escape 
behavior. What is perhaps worth stressing here is that the T3 neurons serve as the 
basis for the “evolution” of a more “sophisticated” set of neurons, the T2 
neurons which not only signal the presence of a looming stimulus but the presence 
of a looming stimulus moving on a particular type of trajectory. This new system 
then modulates T3 activity by projecting to the same motor heading map and 
competing there with the T3 input, rather than acting upon the T3 array itself. 
This is another instance of Principle 2 on Evolution and Modulation. 
We refer the reader to [31] for further details of the neurophysiological data 
which grounds the model, for further details of the circuitry involved in the 
model, and for a number of analyses of the simulations that we have conducted. 
Reflecting on the control schemes shown in Figs. 1, 3 and 5 we come to the third 
principle: 
Principle 3 (Interaction of partial representations). A multiplicity of different 
representations-whether they be partial representations on a retinotopic basis, 
abstract representations of knowledge about types of object in the world, or more 
abstract “planning spaces”-must be linked into an integrated whole. Such 
linkage, however, may be mediated by distributed processes of competition and 
cooperation. There is no one place in the brain where an integrated representa- 
tion of space plays the sole executive role in linking perception of the current 
environment to action. 
We close the presentation by noting that simulation shows that as the stimulus 
speed increases, the time until the network yields a motor command decreases. 
This is a direct relation that follows from the network properties that we have 
sampled to explain the avoidance behavior. The velocity-dependent response time 
is due to the property of the T3 and other neurons whose firing rates increase as 
the speed of a looming stimulus increases. This result may be contrasted with the 
great body of work in the motion vision literature which interposes the computa- 
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tion of the optic flow field between the retinal input and the motor output. Where 
Gibson [17] noted that the optic flow could provide useful input for navigation, 
Lee and Lishman [26] explicitly showed how the time until contact of an 
approaching object could be inferred from the optic flow field, and suggested 
ways in which this explicit time parameter could be used to gate action. Here, we 
have offered an alternative model in which the action is controlled adaptively 
without the explicit extraction of time until contact from the optic flow. 
5. Application of the looming avoidance model to robot control 
The model for frog looming perception is directly applicable to obstacle 
avoidance in autonomous navigation, since, from a relative motion point of view, 
the situation where an object moves towards a robot is similar to one in which the 
robot moves towards the object. Moreover, the two situations become identical 
when a mobile robot has to negotiate moving obstacles. An experiment has been 
conducted to test the capability of the looming avoidance model in detecting 
obstacles and providing a detour path [30,32]. The robotic experiment was 
carried out in an integrated testbed consisting of Neural Simulation Language 
(NSL) [49] for implementing the neural network model, and the Rapid Robotics 
Application Development environment (R*AD) [16] for dynamic control of a 
robot arm. A camera mounted on the moving robot arm provides the visual 
inputs to the neural network, which computes the 3-D motion of the obstacles and 
determines an appropriate “escape” direction to guide the robot arm to go 
around the obstacles (Fig. 6). 
Though the detection of obstacles and the computation of trajectory relative to 
the moving camera is performed in the same way as described above, there is one 
major difference between the looming avoidance behavior and obstacle avoid- 
ance. In the simulation of looming avoidance, only one approaching stimulus is 
presented at a time, whereas multiple obstacles are present in the robot 
experiment. This raises several interesting issues that the model must deal with, 
including occlusion, detection of gaps between obstacles, sizes constancy for 
obstacles of different sizes at different distances, and the interaction and 
integration of multiple obstacle signals. 
Unlike avoiding a single looming object where the data of escape direction is 
obtained experimentally and the projection from the looming detectors is fixed, 
the heading for avoiding multiple obstacles has to be determined dynamically 
based on their spatial arrangement. Here we adopt the motor heading map [ll] to 
provide a substrate on which signals of multiple obstacles interact and compete 
with each other and a heading of the next step for the robot to take emerges from 
such interaction. For this scheme to work, the signal should indicate not the 
location and extent of the obstacle, but rather, it should specify the opening 
beyond the edges of an obstacle. This is achieved by projecting looming detectors 
to the motor map via a connectivity patten that resembles an inverted DOG 
(Difference of Gaussians). Through such a convolution, neurons activated by an 
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images 
Looming-based 
path planner 
I 
arm motion commands 
Fig 6. Experimental setup for robot navigation. The illustration at the top shows the architecture of 
the integrated system. The high-level control is performed by neural network models written in NSL, 
whereas the low-level robot manipulation is computed by R’AD. An interface (gateway) provides the 
protocol for communication between these two components. In addition to controlling the robot arm, 
R*AD also provides frame grabbing routines for visual inputs from a camera. One image frame is 
taken after every move made by the robot and is fed into the looming perception neural network. The 
neural network locates the position of the obstacles based on the looming patterns and selects an 
optimal path based on some criteria (locally shortest path in this case) by specifying the direction of 
the next movement. 
obstacle inhibit cells on the map that correspond to the same spatial location and 
excite those that are some distance away. As a result, only cells whose location 
corresponds to an opening (or gap between two obstacle) can be activated. 
The presence of multiple obstacles (and hence multiple gaps) raises the 
question of which route to choose. A winner-takes-all mechanism proposed by 
Didday [13] is built into the motor map. A simple mechanism which gives higher 
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preference to more centrally located gaps is employed to obtain a locally optimal 
path (shortest path length). This is implemented as a differential tonic firing rate 
for cells in the motor map such that more centrally located ones have higher 
background activity. Therefore, a more centrally located gap has a greater 
probability to emerge as the winner on the map. Here we see that the motor map 
offers a medium to which various sources can send biasing signals (e.g., the 
desirability of a path or deviation from the intended route, etc.) to modulate the 
competition (cf. Principles 1, 2 and 3). 
Since the only available information is the expansion of the image of obstacles, 
the model is confronted by a problem, namely, without depth information, how 
can the model respond to a small obstacle at a closer distance instead of a larger 
one at a greater distance when the latter subtends a bigger visual angle (i.e., it 
casts a bigger image on the camera)? Although only expanding patterns in the 
image are available, it provides a crucial clue about the distance of an object, 
namely, motion parallax. Motion parallax refers to the fact that for two objects 
moving at the same speed at different distances, the closer one generates a greater 
retinal shift, i.e., its image moves at a higher speed than the more distant one. 
Therefore, once the camera starts moving, the looming detector will respond 
more strongly to the smaller and closer obstacle since it elicits more retinal 
ganglion cells. In several experiments with obstacles of different sizes, the model 
demonstrated the capability of correctly avoiding them based on motion parallax 
(Fig. 7; for details of the robotic application see [32]). 
6. From instinctive to reflective behavior 
So far we have focused on instinctive behavior with sensorimotor transforma- 
tion at its core. The sensorimotor system is composed of schema assemblages that 
are “evolutionarily hardwired” into patterns of competition and cooperation 
between specific brain regions. The animal performs in a “reactive” mode to 
interact with a dynamic environment, with little or no lookahead planning. 
Although great efficiency can be achieved via such hardwired schema assem- 
blages, they are unable to compose a truly flexible set of representations of the 
world or to provide a large functional repertoire to cope with the diversity of a 
natural environment beyond the niche to which they have evolved. Furthermore, 
the notion of goal is not explicitly represented. The evolutionary pressure of 
flexibility leads to the development of other systems (not necessarily one fully 
general such system) where explicit representation is employed to support goal- 
oriented reflective behavior which compensates for the shortcomings of the 
sensorimotor system. Furthermore, it is the mechanism that facilitates the 
intimate interaction between these two sets of systems that allows humans to 
achieve a high degree of flexibility and efficiency at the same time. 
The same problem also arises in AI, though along quite a different (almost 
reversed) evolutionary course. In “classical” AI, explicit planning precedes 
execution, taking the form of a centralized sequential deliberation based on goals 
Fig. 7. Estimating depth based on motion parallax. The top shows three snap shots of the robot arm 
moving around three obstacles (from left to right). The frames in the bottom row show images seen 
through the robot‘s eye (the video camera). In this experiment, a large object is placed behind two 
small objects The looming neural network is able to detect the small ones first based on motion 
parallax and guides the robot arm through them first. 
and a world model to yield a sequence of actions. Such an approach may impose 
unrealistic requirements for modeling and perception since all relevant infor- 
mation must be available before planning begins. This makes it hard to adapt the 
plan to events not predicted by the model, In reaction to this, some critics have 
advocated reactive systems in which selection and execution of actions are 
inextricably intertwined (e.g., the subsumption architecture of Brooks [9], 
Kaelbling [24], Agre and Chapman [l]). Such reactive systems are parallel and 
distributed, with a hardwired priority scheme which is fixed at “compile time”. 
There is no deliberation, and no model. Inhibition/suppression rules determine 
which models will control action, on the basis of current input. However, such 
reactive systems are hardwired, difficult to design, and completely data-oriented, 
and the goals are implicit and thus cannot be referred to in decision making. This 
leads to the development of hybrid systems to achieve a dynamic intertwining of 
planning and execution [35-37,421 ( see aiso 1461 on dynamic planning). Here, 
though along an almost reversed evolutionary course, we see the need for reactive 
(instinctive) behavior and reflective behavior and, moreover, their integration 
into a coherent whole. 
In the next section, we will outline a computer vision system constructed within 
the framework of schema theory to demonstrate how the integration of planning 
and reaction can be achieved in a manner consistent with the principles of 
cooperative computation and evolution by modulation. Before we do that, 
however, an important contrast between biological evolution and that of AI is 
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worth noting. With its roots in symbolic representation, the AI tradition is carried 
over from planning to reactive systems and into the latest development of the 
hybrid approach of dynamic planning. In biological evolution, on the other hand, 
we see two distinct representational schemes subserving instinctive and reflective 
behaviors, namely, implicit (subsymbolic) and explicit (both symbolic and 
subsymbolic) representations. Using implicit representations, the animal achieves 
efficiency in “routine” performance of instinctive behaviors like feeding or 
fleeing, whereas explicit representation lends itself to contemplation and, through 
dynamic composition, provides a rich set of representations of the world as the 
basis for flexible reasoning and planning. The process of learning to drive a car 
with the help of verbal instruction shows that explicit representations may 
orchestrate a variety of implicit representations (such as visual recognition of an 
impending collision) and that constant rehearsal of explicit representations may 
yield to their automatization in which they come to form schemas that are 
normally under implicit control, while still possessing paths for explicit access in 
exceptional circumstances. 
The distinction between the reflective and instinctive behaviors can be illus- 
trated in the cortical visual systems of primates, i.e., the “what” pathway which 
performs object recognition and the “how” pathway which mediates interaction 
with objects [l&45]. The “what” pathway runs along the ventral part of the brain 
whereas the “how” system involves the dorsal part (with massive interconnection 
between them along the way). Lesion to the “what” pathway in monkey impairs 
the performance of visual pattern discrimination and recognition but not object 
location tasks. Quite the opposite results were observed in monkeys with lesions 
to the “how” pathway. Further observations have been reported in human 
patients. Goodale and Milner [18] have noted the ability of a patient with a 
ventral lesion to carry out a variety of object manipulations even though unable to 
demonstrate explicit knowledge of the object parameters used to guide these 
actions. For example, when asked to pick up objects with various sizes or 
orientations, the patient is able to preshape the hand according to the size and 
orientation of the object to pick it up. Yet, when asked to indicate the size or the 
orientation of the objects either by means of her hand or verbally, the patient 
failed to do so. The opposite deficit was observed in another patient with lesion to 
the “how” pathway. While this patient had no difficulty in recognizing objects, 
her ability to pick up such objects is severely impaired. Further review of such 
data, and a fuller expansion of the argument in Section 7, may be found in [5]. 
The advantage of using the subsymbolic representation is efficiency. We have 
seen examples of such representation in previous sections, e.g., the retinotopic 
maps in the frog’s for coding the location and direction of a looming stimulus or 
the potential field in detour behavior. The utilization of subsymbolic representa- 
tions is not exclusive to instinctive behavior; indeed, as we saw in our discussion 
of learning to drive, instances of such representation can be found even in 
behaviors that are considered highly cognitive. Consider the process of acquiring 
a second language. One first learns a set of grammatical rules and uses the 
language poorly by applying those rules. Speaking a new language (or even one’s 
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native language, of that matter) in such a way is inefficient. However, as learning 
progresses and one’s mastery of the language improves, more and more of the 
rules “disappear” from consciousness and one starts to use the language without 
explicitly thinking about it. Only after such transferring of the rules (or knowl- 
edge in more general situations) from explicit to implicit representation, so that 
the agent becomes capable of behaving without explicitly reasoning on the rules 
(or symbolic knowledge), can efficiency be achieved. 
We have charted the nearly opposite evolutionary courses in biology and AI 
and shown that, in the end, the agents (both biological and artificial) come to be 
confronted with the same set of problems due to the demands of efficiency and 
flexibility in interaction with the environment which lead to the development of 
reflective and instinctive behaviors and the corresponding underlying representa- 
tional schemes. We stress that it is the integration of these two behaviors that 
brings out the essence of intelligence. 
7. From vision to distributed planning 
Our study of animal-based robot design introduces an evolutionary basis for the 
design of intelligent systems. It is our task now to chart the “evolutionary 
breakthrough” which adds “reflective” capabilities to this basis in a fashion 
consistent with the principles of cooperative computation and evolution by 
modulation that we have enunciated above-but, to conserve space, we will do 
this very briefly, referring the reader to Arbib and Goodale [5] for details. We do 
this by addressing the integrative question of how complex visual scenes affect 
human behavior. The approach to schema-based interpretation in the VISIONS 
computer vision system [14] employs active, independent, schema instances, and 
the schemas encode mechanisms for using features in multiple representations, 
conducting information fusion and sensor fusion in a knowledge-directed manner. 
The knowledge required for interpretation is stored in LTM (long-term memory) 
as a network of perceptual schemas, while the state of interpretation of the 
particular scene unfolds in STM (working memory) in the form of a network of 
schema instances. Each schema instance has an associated activity level (or 
confidence level) which changes on the basis of interactions with other units in the 
(dynamically reconfigurable) STM network. The STM network makes context 
explicit: each object represents a context for further processing, using to 
advantage the relations among objects. When a schema instance is activated, it is 
with an associated area of the image and an associated set of local variables. 
Different instances of a given schema may be associated with separate portions of 
the image if they correspond to different instances of the “object” the schema 
represents. The structure of STM is further constrained in part by relationships 
encoded within LTM, both those between schemas for inter-object relations and 
those within a schema for geometric relations of parts. 
In the VISIONS system, it is the user who starts the interpretation process by 
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invoking general goals such as “interpret this image as a road scene” or such 
specific goals as “find the sidewalk in this image”. The point we stress here is that 
the above considerations still have much to offer when applied to analyzing the 
vision of a robot or an animal. However, in such systems, it is the current goals of 
the autonomous system, not the demands of some user, that guide the process of 
action-oriented perception. Changing goals change the perceptual demands as 
action proceeds. 
The VISIONS system exemplifies a distributed form of planning-as the result 
of activity emerging in a flexible network-involving generativity to form novel 
patterns of schema activation that may involve creation of novel “networks”. 
However, if we extend the analysis so that motor schemas are activated as well as 
the perceptual schemas of STM, we see that planning will be intertwined with 
execution, with patterns of schema activation modified and thus the “plan” 
updated as action proceeds and new sensory stimulation is obtained (similar 
principles are adapted in the IPUS architecture for acoustic signal interpretation 
[28], see also [41] for active vision). We thus see planning as a process emerging 
from the cooperative computation of multiple agents rather than being imposed 
by a separate executive planning system, thus providing an approach to the 
reactive (we prefer the term “dynamic”) planning reviewed by Lyons and 
Hendriks [35]. 
Schema theory provides a distributed model of computation, supporting many 
concurrent activities for recognition of objects, and the planning and control of 
different activities. Each instance of a schema has an associated activity level. That 
of a perceptual schema represents a “confidence level” that the object repre- 
sented by the schema is indeed present; while that of a motor schema may signal 
its “degree of readiness” to control some course of action. The use, representa- 
tion, and recall of knowledge is mediated through the activity of a network of 
interacting computing agents, the schema instances, which between them provide 
processes for going from a particular situation and a particular structure of goals 
and tasks to a suitable course of action (which may be overt or covert, as when 
learning occurs without action or the animal changes its state of readiness). This 
activity may involve passing of messages, changes of state (including activity 
level), instantiation to add new schema instances to the network, and deinstantia- 
tion to remove instances. Moreover, such activity may involve self-modification 
and self-organization, but the topic of learning (save by implication in our analysis 
of evolutionary design) is beyond the scope of this article (readers are referred to 
the extension by Earl and Firby to construct new schemas for reactive planning). 
A schema network does not, in general, need a top-level executor since schema 
instances can combine their effects by distributed processes of competition and 
cooperation (i.e., interactions which, respectively, decrease and increase the 
activity levels of these instances), rather than the operation of an inference engine 
on a passive store of knowledge. This may lead to apparently emergent behavior, 
due to the absence of global control. 
The transition we have seen from frog visuometer coordination to human visual 
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perception ’ is reminiscent of the “Great Move” charted by Newell [39] from 
using specialized materials to support different schemas to using a medium in 
which it is possible to compose copies of whatever schemas are needed to form 
novel representations. Contrasting the study of ethologists of the adaptive 
character of lower organisms with the rich repertoire of human cognitive abilities, 
Newell observes that: 
Finding feasible representations gets increasingly difficult with a richer and 
richer variety of things to be represented and richer and richer kinds of 
operational transformations that they undergo. More and more interlocking 
representation laws need to be satisfied. . Instead of moving towards more 
and more specialized materials with specialized dynamics to support an 
increasingly great variety and intricacy of representational demands, an 
entirely different turn is possible. This is the move [the Great Move] to using 
a neutral, stable medium that is capable of registering variety and then 
composing whatever transformations are needed to satisfy the requisite 
representation law. Far from representational constriction, this path opens up 
the whole world of indefinitely rich representations. (Newell [39, p. 611). 
We may note here that Brooks [9] sets an ethologically inspired hierarchy of 
levels of control (mentioned earlier as being in the spirit of our schema-based 
design principles), each biasing rather than replacing the one below it, in 
opposition to the “classical” view of abstract operators applied to uniform 
representations. In his general cognitive architecture for problem solving, SOAR, 
Newell offers a somewhat broader version of classical AI, since he allows a 
variety of problem spaces-but nonetheless sees these each as being implemented 
in some uniform medium. However, it is mistaken to see this as a sharp 
dichotomy in which one school or the other must prove triumphant. The schema 
theoriest (as in our discussion of the “what” and “how” visual systems) explains a 
complex cognitive function through the interaction of “instinctive” schemas, 
implemented in specifically evolved circuitry, and “abstract” schemas that are 
developed through learning and experience in relatively “general purpose” 
(highly adaptive, post-Great-Move) circuitry. An intelligent system needs to 
combine the ability to react rapidly (jumping out of the way 
vehicle when crossing the street) with the ability to abstractly 
(deciding on the best way to get to the next appointment). 
of an unexpected 
weigh alternatives 
’ The VISIONS model is not a biological model and, indeed, the generic architecture sketched above 
allows an unlimited number of schema instances to process simultaneously-ignoring crucial issues of 
focus of attention. However. Arbib and Goodale IS] review evidence on primate cerebral cortex to 
suggest how processing algorithms and memory strategies inspired by the distributed planning model 
outlined so briefly above may indeed be encoded in the brain. The result is not a brain model per se, 
but rather a sketch of a dramatically new approach to modeling the interaction of cortical mechanisms 
for vision and action. 
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In summary, a satisfactory account of Newell’s “Great Move” should not 
seek a complete break from using specialized materials to support different 
schemas to using a medium in which it is possible to compose copies of 
whatever schemas are needed to form novel representations. Rather, we 
should provide-in the manner of schema theory-insight into how instinc- 
tive behavior provides a basis for, and is intertwined with, rational behavior. 
When we study frogs, we see the animal’s behavior mediated by the dynamic 
interaction of multiple special-purpose schemas implemented in dedicated 
neural circuitry. But when we seek to understand human vision, we combine 
a model of low-level vision implemented across a set of dedicated brain 
regions [12] with a variety of “general-purpose” media in which copies of 
schemas (schema instances) can be assembled, parameterized, and bound to 
regions of the image as they compete and cooperate in a process of 
distributed planning which creates an interpretation of a visual scene (cf. [3], 
especially Sections 5.1, 5.2, 7.3, and 7.4). The contrast between frog 
visuomotor coordination and the flexibility of human visual perception makes 
explicit the contrast between those schema assemblages that are “evolution- 
arily hardwired” into patterns of competition and cooperation between 
specific brain regions, and those which can, through multiple instantiations 
(both data- and hypothesis-driven), yield totally novel forms to develop new 
skills and represent novel situations. 
Principle 4 (Interpretation us planning). The mechanisms of distributed 
interaction seen in visual interpretation extend to distributed goal-directed 
planning. 
Principle 5 (Distributed goal-directed planning). Moreover, the “Great 
Move” takes us from dedicated circuitry for every schema to the creation of 
novel schemas distributed across relatively general-purpose machinery. 
Distributed goal-directed planning combines reactive aspects (dynamic updat- 
ing) with working memory and focus of attention mechanisms. 
The hedge “relatively” in the expression “relatively general-purpose 
machinery” is important. Recent advances in neuroanatomy have increasing- 
ly demonstrated that what were once thought to be large undifferentiated 
brain regions can in fact be discriminated into far smaller regions with 
distinctive patterns of input and output connections [19]. Presumably, each of 
these regions can access a distinct set of other regions, and as these sets of 
subsets can be developed hierarchically, the result can be a “general- 
purpose” representation-but one which is distributed across more or less 
specialized partial representations (in the spirit of Principle 3) each in a 
specified brain region, rather than being a set of states of neutrally-addressed 
registers in the totally uniform computational medium of the serial general- 
purpose computers used in Newell’s many contributions to “classical” AI. 
8. Relating structure and function: from biology to technology 
Many authors have emphasized that the brain can be analyzed at many 
different levels of detail going all the way from the overall brain through the 
various anatomically separable brain regions to layers or modules of cells down to 
the individual neurons, and from there down even further to various cellular 
components and even to the very molecules themselves. This corresponds to the 
right-hand path shown in Fig. S(a). However, what this figure emphasizes is that 
in computational neuroscience we will as often start from a behavior of the 
organism as from a concern with particular brain regions of the organism. We 
must stress that a functional unit (a schema) must not be equated with a structural 
unit (a component or processor)-in general, a schema may be implemented 
across several components, and a component may contribute to several functions 
(Fig. l(b)). When we start from the behavior we are committed to a functional 
analysis; when we start from one or more brain regions, we are committed to a 
structural analysis. In this paper we have given some sense of how schemas may 
be defined without any commitment as to their implementation within specific 
neural circuits, but we have then suggested how this functional analysis may be 
considered by the data of neurobiology. We can directly confront the functional 
decomposition of schemas with the structural decomposition of brain regions. 
etc., by using lesion analysis to see whether our account of interacting schemas 
when coupled with hypotheses about which particular brain regions are involved 
(recall Fig. 1) bear up when we look at the behavior of animals with brain lesions. 
However, structure and function may be brought even more directly together, as 
we saw in Section 4, when we analyze the neural circuitry in a brain region to see 
Fig. 8. Views of level of analysis of (a) brain and behavior and (b) a distributed AI system. 
highlighting the role of schemas as an intermediate level of functional analysis in each case. 
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whether it can provide the functionality demanded by the schemas mapped on to 
this region. Our examples from frog visuomotor coordination have shown both 
that a schema inferred on the basis of a functional analysis may indeed correspond 
to the interaction of many brain regions, and that a specific brain region may be 
implicated in a number of different schemas. Finally, although we have not 
discussed this above, Fig. 8(a) emphasizes that neuroscience often proceeds to the 
subneural level to explain how, for example, the properties of synapses can 
mediate the computations and learning properties of individual cells (see, e.g., 
Section 8.1 of [3]). 
When we turn from the brain to artificial systems-whether under the rubric of 
distributed artificial intelligence, neural engineering, or perceptual robotics-we 
find a somewhat different situation, as shown in Fig. 8(b). In the study of the 
brain we are committed to the fact that any functionality must-at least in 
principle (though we may choose to stop our modeling of at least some functions 
at the schema level)-be played over neural networks. In contrast, in an artificial 
system there is no such commitment. We pick the optimal implementation for a 
particular functionality and this may indeed differ from function to function. 
Thus, rather than seeing schemas as providing a path alternate to that of the 
structural path, as we did for computational neuroscience in Fig. S(a), we here see 
schemas as providing the language of cooperative computation and distributed 
representation in which we provide the coarse-grain analysis of the interacting 
functionalities required to meet the overall problem specification. Branching 
occurs from the schema level to the level of fine-grain implementations-Fig. 8(b) 
shows just two examples, namely artificial neural networks and symbolic program- 
ming. The unification may then occur at the lowest level where, irrespective of the 
intermediate level of implementation, we come to a computational medium such 
as VLSI or optoelectronics which may either be used uniformly as a substrate for 
many different intermediate forms, or may be chosen varyingly in the design of 
dedicated processors for different families of schemas. In the spirit of Principle 5, 
it will be a major design issue to determine which schemas are most efficiently 
implemented in special-purpose hardware, and which-and in which various 
subsets-are programmed to share general-purpose hardware with a variety of 
other schemas. 
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